Skip to content
View original post on X: BAAIOfficial
Published
47/100

BAAI proposes a safety defense for diffusion LLMs during denoising

AIBAAI says standard defenses struggle with diffusion LLMs because benign tokens can become risk-inducing in intermediate denoising states. Its method uses a lightweight safety value model trained with Spine Tree Search and K-branch rollouts, judged by Qwen Guard, to predict final safety from partial states.
BAAIVerified on XOfficial
@BAAIBeijing
View on X

Part of a thread · earlier post

Why do standard defenses struggle with Diffusion LLMs (DLMs)?

Unlike left-to-right autoregressive models, DLMs denoise tokens iteratively with bidirectional dependencies. Even benign tokens ("might","by","to") can act as risk-inducing tokens in intermediate states, shifting the conditional distribution toward an unsafe final output.

Instead of costly block-level regeneration or full-model retraining, BAAI exploits the editability of DLM intermediate states via three key designs:

🔹Lightweight Safety Value Model: Trained via Spine Tree Search & K-branch Rollouts(with Qwen Guard judge) to predict final safety from partial denoising states.

🔹Zero-Backbone-Rerun Counterfactual Readout: Reuses cached token features via Masked Cross-Attention (Full, Exclusion, and Single-token views) to computeNecessity & Sufficiencyrisk attribution in one lightweight pass.

🔹Surgical Re-masking: Selectively re-masks only high-risk tokens while keeping safe context intact.

Source details

BAAI · x.comPublished · added here

Original title: Why do standard defenses struggle with Diffusion LLMs (DLMs)?